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Ryan Charles Gagliot
Nietzsche observed that the commonest stupidity consists of forgetting
what one is trying to do.' As Ratna Kapur argues in Erotic Justice: Law and
the New Politics of Postcolonialism, political activism's continued reliance on
liberal and Western feminist agendas evinces an absence of deep thinking, in
turn unwittingly reinforcing the hegemony and subordination it means to
challenge. In this collection of essays, Kapur draws from postcolonial feminist
legal theory to critique the misguided causal logic of liberalism, which
mistakenly assumes that "more rights lead to more freedom and greater
equality." 2 Examining law and political activism, Kapur concludes that, unless
modem postcolonial society is understood as the site of an historical, discursive
struggle informed by the colonial past, steadfast allegiance to the rights project
of liberalism risks perpetuating the subordination of oppressed subaltern groups
under the illusive panacea of universal rights.3 Kapur uses her analysis of the
condition of Indian women, transnational migrants, and sexual subalterns-
groups marginally situated in and subordinate to hegemonic Indian culture-to
interrogate the broader agenda of liberalism and Western feminism. This
agenda ostensibly endeavors to protect third-world "victims," but, instead,
Kapur argues, it tends to offer legal protection on terms that paradoxically
reinforce normative and essentialist assumptions of gender, culture, and
agency-thus perpetuating the very subordination and victimization it seeks to
remedy.
But Erotic Justice not only challenges the politics of liberalism and
Western feminism by exposing the limitations of the rights project; Kapur's
collection of essays goes a step further and asks what the basis of political
activism should be without the comfort of liberalism's clear yet misguided
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2008.
1. FREDRICK NIETZSCHE, THE WANDERER AND His SHADOW § 206 (1880).
2. RATNA KAPUR, EROTIC JUSTICE: LAW AND THE NEW POLITICS OF POSTCOLONIALISM 11 (2005).
3. Id. at 5-6.
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agenda.4 Unfortunately, Erotic Justice does not fully answer this question;
Kapur suggests that merely opening up the space for new and imaginative
possibilities by freeing the political realm from the fallacy of liberalism is
productive and useful. 5 Still, the disappointment of Erotic Justice in failing to
answer its own central question is less indicative of Kapur's authorial
shortcomings than it is a sign that the theoretical framework of postcolonialism
needs to be reevaluated. Indeed, in recent years the utility of postcolonialism
as an analytical framework has been challenged, and critics have railed against
6it on epistemological, methodological, and practical grounds. Postcolonialism
has been criticized for failing to address the true problems of developing
nations, issues such as "poverty, resource distribution, state violence, human-
rights violations, urban sanitation, and development"; 7 it has been criticized for
lacking theoretical or methodological bearing and clarity of objectives; and it
has been criticized for having become self-referential and self-important-the
4. Id. at 10.
5. Kapur regularly reminds the reader that the purpose of Erotic Justice is not to articulate specific
legal reforms or outline actionable strategies that will better achieve justice for third-world subaltems:
"This book is not focused on developing legal strategies for liberating the Other. Instead, my endeavour
is to force an interrogation of, and a sense of accountability within, the scholarship produced by and on
behalf of women and subaltern subjects." Id. at 6. See also td at 50 ("I do not argue against law, or for
abandoning a rights project; I argue in favour of evaluating legal claims from a postcolonial perspective,
and engaging with law as a complex, multiple and contingent discourse whose meaning is susceptible to
context, cultural histories and the legacies of the past."); id. at 93 ("The erotic subject challenges the
inviolability of the linear narrative that law tells about sex and culture in India, and continuously
ruptures and redraws the boundaries of both. Its disruptive potential creates the possibility of telling
more complex stories and to speak from a space 'somewhere in between."'); id at 136 ("The recognition
that the postcolonial subject can return the gaze and force an unpacking of the regulatory norms that
underlie women's human rights claims and practices can perhaps provide the alternative and possibly
transformative cosmology we are seeking to move towards."). Kapur never explains exactly what role
she sees her "contingent discourses" as having in the postcolonial feminist "cosmology" she articulates,
nor does Kapur really suggest what legal reforms that incorporate this criticism might look like.
6. This is not the place for a bibliography of the field. See Christine Sylvester, Development
Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Disparate Tales of the "Third World, " 20 THIRD WORLD Q. 703
(1999) for a thoughtful overview of the many criticisms of postcolonialism, focusing primarily on the
political and practical shortcomings of the discipline. See also Vijay Mishra & Bob Hodge, What Was
Postcolonialism?, 36 NEW LIT. HIST. 375-402 (2005) for an overview of the more epistemologically and
methodologically oriented criticisms. These authors draw on the expanding bibliography of
postcolonialism and its critics. See, e.g., PHILIP DARBY, THE FICTION OF IMPERIALISM: READING
BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POSTCOLONIALISM 217 (1998) (accusing postcolonialism of
"making a virtue out of being free-floating and open-ended" that results in its failure to adhere to any
established discipline of thought); ARIF DIRLIK, THE POSTCOLONIAL AURA: THIRD WORLD CRITICISM
IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL CAPITALISM (1997) (criticizing the weakness of postcolonialism's flawed
historical methodology); NEIL LAZARUS, NATIONALISM AND CULTURAL PRACTICE IN THE
POSTCOLONIAL WORLD (1999) (arguing the need for postcolonialism to rearticulate a systematic theory
by reconnecting with Marxism and revitalizing its original focus on dehistoricized historical memories);
GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REASON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE
VANISHING PRESENT (1999) (reexamining postcolonialism through critiques of Kant, Hegel, and Marx
and stressing the need to reestablish links with Marxism).
7. Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, The Third World Academic in Other Places; Or the Postcolonial
Intellectual Revisited, 23 CRITICAL INQ. 615,615 (1997).
8. See DARBY, supra note 6; Mishra & Hodge, supra note 6, at 375-402; Sylvester, supra note 6, at
703-704, 711-716.
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latest incarnation of ivory-tower postmodemism. 9  These criticisms are
especially incisive for a scholarship and a politics that seek to react against the
dominant imposition of liberalism and of Western feminism and to improve the
position of the marginalized and oppressed. Kapur's essays in Erotic Justice
represent an additional, somewhat responsive voice in this theoretical debate.
While Erotic Justice does not respond to all of the critics of postcolonialism,
the methodology and legal focus of the essays offer a promising glimpse of the
future of postcolonial theory as a viable and useful framework. Indeed, if
postcolonialism is to survive the attacks of its critics, it will be because of
methodologically rigorous scholarship like Kapur's Erotic Justice.
Kapur develops her postcolonial feminist framework in her response to
Martha Nussbaum's feminist critique of liberalism, Sex and Social Justice.10 In
the first essay of Erotic Justice, "New Cosmologies: Mapping the Postcolonial
Feminist Legal Project," Kapur finds Nussbaum's challenge to liberalism
insufficient, because, although Nussbaum adequately assesses the limits and
risks of liberalism, she forges ahead with its logic and goals anyway. Wendy
Brown calls this "Yes I know. But..." politics:" Despite the obvious
shortcomings of liberalism, Western feminists and political activists continue to
adhere to the rights project out of fear of the consequences of abandoning its
truth claims and causal logic. Kapur intends her articulation of postcolonial
feminism to release political and intellectual energies that have been trapped by
the constraints of the logic of liberalism and to "open[] up the space for new
political possibilities and imaginations."' 2
According to Kapur, the recurring refrain of Sex and Social Justice is not
that the liberal position is fundamentally flawed, but that there has been a
profound inconsistency and incompleteness in the way liberalism has operated
for women.' 3 Yet, the feminist response Nussbaum proposes is inadequate.
Kapur contends that Nussbaum advocates a feminist politics that attempts to
unmask inequalities within society and the family and to push liberalism's
project of increasingly robust rights regimes into the home and other sites of
patriarchal oppression and subordination. 14 But, Kapur argues, postcolonialism
and subaltern scholarship have thoroughly exposed the fallacy of liberalism's
reliance on the narrative of progress, its inability to transcend assumptions
about the Other, and its mistaken assumptions about the autonomous, atomized
subject.15 And so, continued adherence to the liberal project, even as modified
by feminist critics like Nussbaum, risks perpetuating subordination and
9. DiRLIK, supra note 6, at 329. See also Kwame Anthony Appiah, Is the Post in Postmodernism
the Post in Postcolonialism?, 17 CRITICAL INQ. 356 (1991).
10. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999).
11. WENDY BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY 4 (2001).
12. KAPuR, supra note 2, at 11.
13. Id. at 16-17.
14. Id. at 17-18.
15. Id. at 20-27.
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oppression. As an example, Kapur offers this analogy: Just as liberal values
were used to enable and enhance 19th Century imperialism and colonial
expansion, the religious right-wing nationalist movement and contemporary
conservative political forces in India---collectively, the coalition of the Hindu
Right-have successfully maneuvered the principles and rhetoric of liberalism
to assimilate and subordinate Muslims on normative and essentialist terms, to
build a monolithic conception of nationalism, and to recognize women's rights
within the terms of dominant sexual, cultural, and familial norms; thus, the
religious right-wing in India have managed to maintain the status quo by
affirming hegemonic stereotypes.1
6
In "New Cosmologies," Kapur outlines how, during the development of
Indian nationalism, the law-and in particular the law as it applied to women-
developed into a site of struggle between imperialism and nationalism. The
British partly justified their colonizing presence in India by appealing to the
backwardness of certain customs-for example, child marriage. Liberal-
minded British reformers sought to change what they saw as barbaric and
backward practices, and they imposed laws to increase the age of consent for
marriage from ten to twelve. Indian nationalists resisted reform by
rearticulating the domestic sphere as beyond the reach of colonial intervention.
Although British laws and reform were eventually enacted, the private sphere
of the family emerged from these colonial conflicts as a protected space for the
production of Indian cultural values and tradition. Furthermore, the women
who occupied this space came to embody Indian nationalism, and the
nationalist political elites who constituted the dominant social force projected
onto them a set of essentialist stereotypes of normative sexuality: motherhood,
wifehood, chastity, purity, self-sacrifice, and other sexualized symbols of
Indian culture.'
7
By taking the postcolonial feminist critique seriously and applying its
framework to Indian society and history, Kapur exposes the ways that the
colonial past informs the postcolonial present. Through the lens of
postcolonialism, Kapur demonstrates how the public/private divide that
emerged in 19th-century India was the product of a nationalist resistance to
imperialism that selected the home, female sexuality, and the Indian woman
herself as spaces of Indian cultural autonomy. As Indian nationalists resisted
the imperialist intrusions of British law and Western culture, they articulated
the private sphere as a site of non-colonization. Inscribed within this space,
women were protected from the corrupting influence of the West; in the
process, they became the embodiment of pure, untouched Indian culture.
Kapur's interrogation of the postcolonial present as the site of 'an
intertemporal historical struggle thus reveals the recursive effects of the 19th-
16. Id. at 43-50.
17. KAPUR, supra note 2, at 29-36.
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century struggle for Indian cultural autonomy and independence. In modem
India, the family remains the space of traditional Indian cultural values, and
analogous resistance continues to inform present legal engagement with women
and the private sphere. Insofar as women continue to occupy this space, they
continue to be subjected to stereotyping by the dominant culture-today,
conservative political forces such as the Hindu Right. Where the law has been
permitted entry into the private realm of the family, such as in the
criminalization of adultery, it has done so only to reinforce the moral regulation
of women and sexuality according to dominant sexual ideology and
conservative norms. Thus, the nationalist response to the colonial project of
legal reform-that is, the idealization of women's bodies-also informs
indirectly the substance of law in contemporary India. As a result of the
colonial experience, the Indian woman, as a nationalist ideal and as a
stereotype, remains the locus of legal and cultural contestation.
18
Unfortunately, feminist and liberal engagement with law and sexuality in
this postcolonial context has neither been wholly transformative nor
empowering, and Kapur dedicates much of the remainder of Erotic Justice to
exposing just how political activism has tended to misunderstand postcolonial
feminism and to perpetuate the hegemonic stereotyping of subaltern women,
which, in turn, has stymied the realization of full sexual justice in the
postcolonial world. In her essay "The Tragedy of Victimisation Rhetoric,"
Kapur articulates this criticism most clearly by examining the United Nations
(UN)-led international violence against women campaign, which has led to a
proliferation of legal rights for women. Yet, Kapur argues that the articulation
and implementation of rights meant to protect women has tended to frame the
issue of violence in terms of the victimization of women, which sustains
normative assumptions about gender, sexuality, and culture. 19 This essentialist
treatment of women as agency-less victims without choice only serves to
reinforce their subordination and prevents the development of more robust
systems of justice that would challenge hegemonic stereotypes and normative
assumptions.2 °
But there are areas of contestation where subalterns are challenging the
normative stereotypes and essentialist characterizations of third-world women
as victims without choice or agency. In "Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives
of Culture, Sex and Nation in India" Kapur examines the disruptive forces of
globalized culture, such as satellite television and Western films and music, and
of sexual subalterns, such as prostitutes, homosexuals, and transvestites.
Kapur's "The Other Side of Universality: Cross-Border Movements and the
Transnational Migrant Subject" looks at the challenges posed by transnational
18. Id. at 36-43.
19. Id. at 96-100.
20. Id. at 100-108.
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emigrant women, whose hybridity--or cultural and geographic "in between-
ness"---complicates essentialist assumptions of culture, and whose ability to
choose to leave their homes and move across borders in search of social and
economic opportunity questions assumptions of gender and agency.
Throughout Kapur's essays, women are treated as agents capable of choice,
deciding to work as "sexually assertive" prostitutes or to emigrate across
borders as "transnational migrant subject[s]," thus challenging the assumption
that third-world women are pure and chaste victims confined to the home to act
as dutiful and obedient mothers and wives.21 In prostitution, Kapur sees an
especially powerful, front-end challenge:
to the nationalist narrative of sex and culture. These sex workers are
directly challenging the idea that sex in general, and commercial sex in
particular, are inherently negative, corrosive or otherwise dangerous.
They are boldly asserting the rightful place of sex. And in so doing,
they risk being cast as an even more dangerous affront to Indian
culture and the nation.
22
In each of these areas of contestation, Kapur views the rights project of
Western feminism and liberalism as unwittingly obstructing the ultimate
realization of more comprehensive sexual justice: The Indian feminist
organization, the National Commission on Women, in seeking to protect
"morally pure" Indian women from the corrupting influence of Western film
and music, encouraged the enforcement of laws that would limit the
sensationalization of sex and violence; 23 and liberal reformers-organizations
like the UN and Western governments like Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States-in seeking to control the sex trade and mitigate the risk of
terrorism, have tried to regulate the transnational movement of third-world
subalterns by implementing programs to disincentivize emigration.24 Kapur
sees these activist efforts at liberal reform as misguided and unreflective,
perpetuating hegemonic assumptions that third-world subalterns are agency-
less victims without capacity to choose or act independently.
The limitation, of course, to Kapur's argument is that reading
empowerment, choice, and normative challenges into prostitution, emigration,
and the acceptance of Western culture misses the fact that globalization has
created a new, complex system of winners and losers. For example, the
"decision" of a woman to work as a prostitute or to leave her home in search of
work is as much about the shifting arrangements of global capital as it is about
agency, hybridity, and challenging hegemonic assumptions. On the one hand,
choice can be read into third-world women's "decision" to work as prostitutes
or emigrate for work, and, in a sense, a choice is being made that can, as a
21. Id. at 71,139.
22. KAPuR, supra note 2, at 77.
23. Id. at 65-69.
24. Id. at 70-78, 141-150, 158-169.
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consequence, interrogate and challenge normative stereotypes. At the same
time, truly understanding the "decisions" of these women also requires
examining the social and economic conditions that constrain women's
occupational "choices." Market changes caused by, for example, a foreign
corporation's decision to relocate production, can shift, constrain, and
otherwise distort preferences and markets that had previously been in
equilibrium. In that case, prostitution and emigration are the only viable options
for women with limited skills and attenuated adaptability.
Liberty of choice is of primary importance to theories of agency, hybridity,
and sexual justice, but to be in the position of having to "choose" between
emigration and prostitution is to actually be deprived of liberty, not to exercise
it. Kapur's postcolonial feminist framework incorrectly construes forced
prostitution and compelled emigration as sexual empowerment and cultural
hybridity. By viewing the complexities and problems facing third-world
women as decision-based challenges to hegemonic norms, Kapur reads the
appearance of agency and choice into circumstances where liberty is entirely
absent. In settings of poverty, starvation, and lack of opportunity, choice is
little more than a creative construct-a novel way of reading prostitution and
emigration that ultimately distorts and minimizes the dire conditions of the
third world. Such an ivory-towered misrepresentation of reality has led critics
to challenge the theoretical and political utility of postcolonialism as a
framework for analyzing the third world.25
Kapur rejects this line of criticism, dismissing economic analyses of
exploitation, prostitution, and emigration as reinforcing cultural and gender
essentialism:
Their approach is to characterise sex-workers in India as victims,
whose work is determined by economic hardship. This approach is
located on an East/West binary and assumes that choice is possible in
the West, while economic oppression in Asia is so all-encompassing
that the very possibility of choice or agency is negated.26
But it is not clear that Kapur's critics negate choice or agency along an
East/West binary. It is a very traditional form of Western feminism that views
prostitution--even in industrialized nations-as exploitative and oppressive.
27
True, these accounts are fraught with many of the problems Kapur sees in the
25. See Darby, Postcolontalism, supra note 6; Rajan, supra note 6; Sylvester, supra note 6.
26. KAPUR, supra note 2, at 76.
27. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIDFIED (1987); Margaret A. Baldwin,
Split at the Root: Prostitution and Feminist Discourses of Law Reform, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 47
(1992); Evelina Giobbe & Sue Gibel, Impressions of a Public Policy Initiative, 16 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL'Y 1 (1994); Cheryl Hanna, Somebody's Daughter: The Domestic Trafficking of Girls for the
Commercial Sex Industry and the Power of Love, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2002); Sylvia A.
Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 523 (2000); Dorchen Leidholt,
Prostitution: A Violation of Women's Human Rights, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 133 (1993); Carlin
Meyer, Sex, Sin, & Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1097 (1994).
2005]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
(il)logic of liberalism, but Kapur rejects alternative explanations without much
consideration, because she sees them as perpetuating-at the very least-the
rhetoric of victimization.
For Kapur, the first step toward achieving greater erotic justice and
articulating a more progressive policy solution is to recognize that "[w]omen
can and do choose to move and work in the sex industry, and even find
clandestine means by which to enter into another country. 28 By highlighting
women's choice to work as prostitutes or emigrate for work, the multiple
centers of subaltern discourse come to the foreground, evading the simplifying
tendencies of gender and cultural essentialism. This, in turn, leads to "more
complicated analys[e]s of the cultural location of the sex-worker in India and
counter the cultural essentialism that has informed the legal debates. 29 More
rights and legal protections are not the answer, because they tend to perpetuate
and reinforce norms, not challenge and undermine them. 30 Kapur is especially
critical of the legal reforms proposed by the UN and other Western political
organizations and governments dedicated to the rights project, because their
"questionable statistics have been combined with other confusions between
trafficking, migration, and sex-work.'
But how, exactly, do richer analyses of the location of prostitution in
Indian culture further legal reforms aimed at providing greater economic
opportunities for women without any options other than selling their bodies to
feed themselves and their families? Kapur does not offer a response, nor is her
logic sufficiently articulated to allow the reader to venture a prediction as to
what a postcolonial feminist answer might be. Instead she demurs, identifying
authors and scholars who are working in the field of literary analysis to
uncover, for example, the hidden roots of prostitution in the courtesans of 4th-
century BC India. 32 This is insufficient.
Although Kapur's Erotic Justice correctly criticizes the many weaknesses
of liberalism, it fails to offer any sustainable alternative theoretical or political
way to understand the problems affecting subaltern third-world women and
impeding the realization of greater justice. Granted, by focusing on the law as
a discursive site of conflict, Erotic Justice add' much to the methodological
viability of postcolonialism by signaling a departure from the use of literary
texts and visual arts as evidence of third-world conditions. But Kapur is unable
to remain in the realm of politics and law for long, and she often lapses into the
much more methodologically flexible realm of literature and "episodic"
accounts of contemporary events. 33 Indeed, if law and politics are going to be
28. KAPuR, supra note 2, at 130.
29. Id. at 78.
30. Id at 128-129.
31. Id. 143.
32. Id. at 78.
33. See, e.g., KAPuR, supra note 2, at 138.
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used to substantiate and test postcolonial arguments and hypotheses, additional
analytical tools from the social sciences must be incorporated into the
postcolonial framework. For example, Christine Sylvester, a student of
postcolonial feminism, has engaged in data collection and field work to test her
hypotheses about different perceptions of the needs of women in Zimbabwe,
comparing the needs of women as the women themselves see them with the
markedly different perspectives of development agencies who design programs
for these women.34 Looking to the analytical tools of the social sciences-
much as the liberal rights project has done, as evidenced by the acceptance of
political, sociological, and economic theories of development by the UN,
foreign governments, and other international political organizations-would
move postcolonial scholarship one step closer to articulating viable policy
outcomes, rather than merely opening up a discursive space where creative
descriptions take precedence over much needed reform.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Kapur's Erotic Justice is a provocative
and refreshing addition to the literature of postcolonialism. While greater
rapprochement between liberalism and postcolonialism remains elusive,
Kapur's scholarship is a step in the right direction, and her efforts merit
scholarly attention and praise. Still, if postcolonialism is to remain a viable
framework, it is going to have to adopt some of the methodological rigor of its
intellectual rival-it appears that students of postcolonialism have something
important to learn from practitioners of the liberal rights project after all.
34. See CHRISTINE SYLVESTER, PRODUCING WOMEN AND PROGRESS IN ZIMBABWE: NARRATIVES
OF IDENTITY AND WORK FROM THE 1980s (2000); Christine Sylvester, Urban Women Cooperators,
"Progress," and "African Feminism" in Zimbabwe, "Differences, " 3 J. FEMINIST CULTURAL STUD. 39
(1999); Christine Sylvester, Development Imaginaries: Shall We Dance, Pygmalion? (1999) (paper




Book Review: Women, Madness and the Law. a
Feminist Reader
Edited by Wendy Chan, Dorothy E. Chunn, & Robert Menzies. London:
GlassHouse, 2005. Pp. xii, 301.
Margaret Hellersteint
In the age of ubiquitous psychotherapy, amidst profuse critiques of the
classification and treatment of mental illness, women's relation to 'madness
and the law' has received surprisingly little attention in mainstream literature,
given the long and troubled relationship between women and 'madness" that
continues to resonate in 'psy' sciences, legal regulation, and the criminal justice
system. The collection of essays, Women, Madness, and the Law: a Feminist
Reader, offers feminist perspectives on the ways in which gender informs the
construction, diagnosis, treatment of, and responses to, women's mental illness
in contemporary Anglophonic society.
The essays in this unusual collection explore a variety of themes, such as
criminal insanity in women; feminist critiques of standard diagnosis and
treatment, including women-specific syndromes; confinement of women; and
feminist antipsychiatry. The authors' perspectives range from gently reformist
to defiantly radical, but they share the common opinion that women are
suffering as a result of the current system and that something should be done
about it. The most interesting essays are those that focus on neglected areas of
research (such as women confined to secure hospitals and jails, gender bias in
the insanity defense, and violence by as opposed to against women, to name a
few) and those that propose thoughtful alternatives to practices that
demonstrably oppress women, of which there are regrettably many. These
pieces are interspersed with others that cling to the margins of reasonable
debate or boggle the mind with overgenerous helpings of jargon. Although the
essays are somewhat hit-or-miss, the collection succeeds in shedding light on
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2007.
1. Editors Wendy Chan, Dorothy E. Chunn, and Robert Menzies prefer the term 'madness' to
denote what the psychiatric and lay community would call mental illness. Several of the book's authors
also use the terms 'illness,' 'disorder,' and 'disability,' among others. The debate on terminology
reflects a deeper debate on the nature of the beast, although none of the authors specifically addresses it.
I use the term 'mental illness' throughout this review, not in the interest of siding with mainstream
psychiatry but because it is the standard, and as such is more easily comprehensible and, I hope,
objective.
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some difficult and engaging problems in an area that has been too rarely
addressed in either feminist or psychiatric literature.
Why think about women, mental illness, and the law? For one thing,
women are much more likely to seek psychiatric treatment for mental illness
than men, and they are far more likely (as much as twice as likely as men with
respect to unipolar depression) to suffer from the most common disorders - that
is, depression, anxiety, and somatic disorders. Indeed, as most of the authors
agree, mental illness is traditionally portrayed as a female disease.
"Representations of woman as mad," writes Jane M. Ussher in the opening
chapter, "ranging from the dangerous harridan in the attic, to the melancholic
maiden languishing helplessly on her bed, all stand as reminders of the
potential danger or vulnerability lurking beneath the mask of beauty that
otherwise signifies 'woman.' 3 Patriarchal explanations for sex differences
have alternated between the historical reliance on women's supposedly chaotic
biology to the construal of women as psychically weaker, less resilient, and
more likely to be passive victims. 4 These explanations are surprisingly
persistent even today, and several of the essays in this book work to combat
them.
Feminist thought on women's mental illness ranges from the argument that
an oppressive, sexist, often abusive world naturally produces higher rates of
mental illness in women, to the argument that the historic association of mental
illness with femaleness sends trigger-happy psychiatrists scrambling for their
prescription pads at the first sign of traditionally 'female' emotional responses
even under legitimately upsetting circumstances, to the wholesale rejection of
the field of psychiatry.
Another reason to examine psychiatry from a feminist perspective is that
women, once diagnosed with mental illness, are particularly vulnerable in
institutional settings. As Ann Lloyd discusses in her engaging and readable
chapter, "The Treatment of Women Patients in Secure Hospitals," women
whom the courts deem mentally incapacitated then confine to a hospital are
often subject to various forms of mistreatment, including verbal and physical
2, World Health Organization website at http://www.who.int/mentalhealth/preventionl
genderwomen/en/. See also the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) website for a breakdown of
the rate of diagnosis for women and men by specific illness, available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/
publicat/numbers.cfin.
3. Jane M. Ussher, Unravelling Women's Madness: Beyond Positivism and Construction and
Towards a Material-Discursive-Intrapsychic Approach, in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A
FEMINIST READER 19 (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
4. See generally id; Bonnie Burstow, Feminist Antipsychiarty Praxis - Women and the
Movement(s): A Canadian Perspective, in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER
(Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005); Kathleen Kendall, Beyond Reason: Social Constructions of Mentally
Disordered, in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005);
Hannah Lerman, Women's Misery: Continuing Pigeonholes into the 21st Century, in WOMEN,
MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
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abuse, total infantilisation, and neglect.5 Because the hospital system is ill-
equipped to deal with women and because the staff automatically denies
women any agency, the harms these women experience are so serious they
approach human rights violations.
Women in prison experience similar maltreatment. In "At the Centre of
the New Professional Gaze: Women, Medicine, and Confinement," Joe Sim
discusses the continuing medicalization of women inmates' behavior and
unwillingness to grant them even a modicum of control over their lives and
6treatment. Because the female identity is seen as more passive, less rational,
and less in need of active participation in its own destiny, women in
confinement are extremely vulnerable to abuse and neglect by administrative
systems, often languishing for decades or even forever in institutions they
ought to have left after a year or two.
The experience of mentally ill women in the criminal justice system,
particularly as perpetrators of violent crimes, is one of the most interesting
themes. The social construction of femininity codes the label 'violent woman'
as either a contradiction in terms or a diagnosis of profound role-betrayal, be it
through illness or evil. Even apart from the behaviors society prescribes for
women, the characteristics supposed to be inherent to the female sex are
incompatible with violence. In other words, even a badly-behaved woman is
thought to have a fundamentally passive, emotionally needy, weak-willed
nature regardless of her failure to display the 'ideal' feminine characteristics of
empathy and nurturing.7 Consequently, the character of the murderess is not
only abhorrent but incoherent, whereas the male murderer is guilty instead of
succumbing to the ugly extreme of masculine aggressiveness. As a result,
individual women murderers are portrayed either as horrific monsters or as
pitiable victims of abuse8 and of their own irrationality or underdeveloped
moral capacity,9 depending on the journalist.
5. See Ann Lloyd, The Treatment of Women Patients in Secure Hospitals, in WOMEN, MADNESS,
AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
6. See Joe Sim, At the Centre of the New Professional Gaze: Women, Medicine and Confinement in
WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
7. See generally Kendall, supra note 4; Lloyd, supra note 5; Sim, supra note 6.
8. Many women murderers have in fact been abused. The point is not that it doesn't matter, but that
this history of abuse is used to avoid assigning agency to women. For essays on this topic, see Wendy
Chan, Gender, Murder and Madness in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER
(Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005); Kendall, supra note 4; Robert Menzies & Dorothy E. Chunn,
Charlotte's Web: Historical Regulation of 'Insane' Women Murderers in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE
LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
9. Herein lies a paradox. Women are often seen as more likely than men to be 'good' due to their
alleged tendency toward self-sacrifice and nurturing. On the other hand, philosophers since Aristotle
have construed women as so controlled by their biology that they can never truly rule the body with the
mind and thus cannot qualify as fully-formed moral beings. The best way to understand sexist views on
women's morality in contemporary society may be to say that women are alleged to have a naturally
docile and nurturing disposition, but that they lack men's capacity for integrity. See Kendall, supra note
4.
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In this sense, the lines between madness and badness in women become
blurred. A woman murderer is necessarily a little bit crazy, the logic goes,
because her behavior is otherwise inexplicable. And these "doubly mad and
bad" women are a fearsome lot. No one can seem to agree on whether to pity
them or despise them; the one constant is the sense of dissonance and
discomfort they produce. This public inability to understand the woman
murderer places the suspect at risk for mistreatment: her chosen plea of self-
defense may be discouraged in favor of an insanity plea; she may be committed
for life to a mental institution despite no evidence of serious mental illness; she
almost definitely will be subject to a psychic tug-of-war for agency even after
she makes her plea.
10
Kathleen Kendall, in her excellent and provocative essay entitled "Beyond
Reason: Social Constructions of Mentally Disordered Female Offenders,"
begins with a striking discussion of the various armchair psychoanalyses of
Aileen Wuornos, the serial killer executed in 2002.11 "[Blecause criminality
implies responsibility for one's actions and madness infers [sic] the opposite,
the two categories appear incongruous," writes Kendall.' 2 "[F]emales deemed
both mad and bad endanger the social order not only through their actions, but
because they threaten to expose the fissures and failures within the myriad of
methods designed to understand and manage society's miscreants. ' 13 Kendall,
along with Robert Menzies and Dorothy E. Chunn 14 and Wendy Chan' 5 expose
the astonishing incapacity of contemporary and nineteenth-century society to
deal with women murderers in society and in the criminal justice system. These
three essays are among the most compelling in the collection.
Another major theme of the book is the examination of how women's
mental suffering is construed, what results from the standard approach, and
how it should be changed. The answers given vary widely, as does the quality
of the essays on this topic. The standout is Hannah Lerman's "Women's
Misery: Continuing Pigeonholes into the 2 1t Century," in which she provides
an overview and critique of diagnostic systems as they are applied to women.1
6
The "bible of the mental health field," the DSM-IV-TR, attempts an
atheoretical and objective classification of mental disorders that eschews any
discussion of etiology or context. Lerman offers a level-headed and useful
feminist critique of the DSM-IV-TR, noting that it succeeds in providing a
means for communication among professionals and between clinicians and
patients, as well as a starting point for thinking about treatment (e.g. bipolar
10. Paula J. Caplan, Sex Bias in Psychiatric Diagnosis and the Courts in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND
THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
11. Kendall, supra note 4, at 41-44.
12. Id. at41.
13. Id. at 42.
14. See Chunn, supra note 8.
15. See Chan, supra note 8.
16. See Lerman, supra note 4.
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disorders respond to mood stabilizers, whereas unipolar affect disorders do
not), yet puts patients at risk (too often borne out) of being treated first as labels
and second as people. In addition, the lack of any discussion on etiology or
context means that women who develop stigmatizing disorders such as
Borderline Personality Disorder because of a history of abuse are viewed as
flawed people (a difficulty with the diagnostic category of personality disorders
in general), and wrongly subjected to a degree of judgment, if not blame.
The most persuasive suggestion offered in the chapter (indeed, perhaps, in
the whole book) is the idea of a category of abuse disorders, which would fall
somewhere between personality disorders and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(the only diagnosis that entails a normal response to an abnormal situation), as
proposed by Lenore Walker. As so many women suffer childhood physical or
sexual abuse that leaves them with pervasive and intractable symptoms
entrenched in the personality (e.g. compulsive self-harm; blunted or
inappropriate affect), this new category could provide not only an alternative to
personality disorders but also a more specific and useful diagnosis for women
who suffer the long-term effects of childhood abuse, with-hopefully-
attendant improvements in treatment. In addition, this diagnosis would also be
useful for men who have suffered abuse. Lerman goes on to examine other
systems of categorizing mental disorders and concludes, convincingly, that no
other alternative as comprehensive and useful as the DSM-IV-TR has been
suggested, but that feminists must work to change and improve this diagnostic
system.
Two essays on post-abortion syndrome and battered women syndrome fall
a little farther from the mark. Eileen Fegan's "Reclaiming Women's Agency"
17
and Julie Stubbs' and Julia Tolmie's "Defending Battered Women on Charges
of Homicide" is attempt to critique two women-specific disorders, Post-
Abortion Syndrome (PAS) and Battered Women Syndrome (BWS), as pseudo-
scientific attacks on women's agency. However, the message in both of these
pieces - that PAS and BWS may not be valid syndromes, and that they are
definitely manipulated by patriarchal regimes to women's detriment - gets lost
in an unfortunate cycle of straw-manning and rhetoric.
Stubbs' and Tolmie's insistence on self-defense as the more desirable plea
than BWS (because of BWS's overtones of passive victimhood, again a valid
point) fails to acknowledge that many 'battered women' who kill their partners
are in fact suffering from a cluster of debilitating emotional problems brought
17. Eileen Fegan, Reclaiming Women's Agency: Exposing the Mental Health Effect of 'Post-
Abortion Syndrome' Propaganda in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A FEMINIST READER (Wendy
Chan et al. eds., 2005).
18. Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, Defending Battered Women on Charges of Homicide: The
Structural and Systemic Versus the Personal and Particular, in WOMEN, MADNESS, AND THE LAW: A
FEMINIST READER (Wendy Chan et al. eds., 2005).
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on by their partners' violence. This is a solid essay, however, and it does
provide a very useful discussion of the relative success of BWS as a defense.
More troublesome is Fegan's dismissal of the subjectivity of women
patients claiming to suffer from PAS. Rather than critique arguments for the
existence of PAS as they have been offered in mainstream literature or by
women themselves, Fegan relies purely on evidence of the far right's use of
PAS as a tool to attack the pro-choice movement (on the basis that abortion is
harmful to women's mental health) and on a few testimonials of women who
felt empowered after undergoing abortions to deny any validity to the
syndrome. If the syndrome exists, it exists, whether or not the anti-choice
movement uses it to attack abortion rights; Fegan spuriously uses proof of its
exploitation by the far right to argue for its nonexistence. This is unfortunate, as
it would be interesting to know how valid PAS really is and whether there are
other women like the few Fegan quotes who also felt empowered, not
depressed, after having an abortion. Furthermore, her argument is cheapened by
her unwillingness to take seriously the experience of post-abortion mental pain
as related by many women.
The most serious critique of the entire collection, which applies across the
board to most if not all of the essays: in attempting to preserve women's agency
in the face of male-centric 'psy' sciences that consistently portray women as
passive victims, many of the authors risk failing, or in fact blatantly do fail, to
give credence to real women's felt experiences. Although even Burstow, 19 the
most egregious offender, claims to empower "women psychiatric survivors" (as
contrasted with the field of psychiatry, which denies them voice), many of
these valiant attempts to empower women completely ignore the severity of
serious mental illness. Whatever the flaws of the current system may be (and
they are deep and numerous), and whatever one chooses to call the
phenomenon, mental suffering does exist and it is incredibly debilitating.
Burstow, without bothering to argue much of anything, summarily renames
institutionalization as "psychiatric assault" (which she favors discussing at
conferences concerned with violence against women) and proposes that
electroshock, "a brain damaging treatment,, 20 be criminalized.
Of the benefits of women's "psychiatric survivor" support groups, she
writes, "They are places where both male chauvinism and sane chauvinism can
be left behind and mad women's identities celebrated.",21 Burstow is right to
critique institutions and institutionalization (as discussed in Lloyd's piece and
mentioned above, institutions as they stand are fairly horrible places to be
19. Burstow, supra note 4.
20. Electroshock therapy is painless; it can cause significant memory loss but it is medically quite
safe and is-or should be--a last resort. What is more, it is mysteriously effective: some patients who
have been suicidally depressed for years and have tried every possible medication see huge benefits
from electroshock. Id at 255.
21. Id. at 250 (emphasis mine).
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confined against one's will), and she is equally on target with her implication
that diagnoses can be both sexist and stigmatizing. Institutions should be utterly
transformed to places of care and treatment, the process of institutionalization
should be significantly modified, and our diagnostic systems need serious
work, as Lloyd and Lemer (among others) discussed in their essays. However,
Burstow's position-that the preference for sanity over insanity is
chauvinism-seems akin to arguing that extreme destitution is simply an
alternative way to live and that humanitarian assistance to the poor thus
constitutes violence against their free agency.
The idea that mental illness should be a celebrated aspect of identity and
that treatment is akin to violence is not only absurd but deeply offensive to
anyone who has ever lost a loved one to depression or schizophrenia or, for that
matter, to anyone who has experienced the joy of finally taking her life back
with the help of treatment.
A final critique: although some of the essays are very clear and well-
written, the profusion of jargon in much of the writing ends up clogging the
narratives and tangling the arguments, especially when the terms are not
defined (and they often are not) and when they seem to be the author's own, or
specific to her very small professional circle (and they often are). Most of the
essays are quite readable and some are fantastically interesting, but the opening
chapter in particular defies comprehension for anyone not well-versed in
postmodernism and critical theory: "I will argue," writes Ussher, "that the
positivistic and realist epistemological perspectives which underlie mainstream
psychological and medical research and clinical intervention should be replaced
not by an interpretivist approach, but by a material-discursive-intrapsychic
perspective, grounded within a critical realist epistemological paradigm. 22 As
the collection is intended to address women, mental illness, and the law, many
readers will not be versed in postmodern jargon and the majority will likely be
at a loss to understand even Ussher's thesis statement.
The quality of the arguments in Women, Madness, and the Law is uneven,
but the fascinating subject matter and the authors' passion for the material
usually make up for it. The book's main strengths are the several innovative
discussions of criminal insanity, the few level-headed essays that survey an
institution or a system and offer an alternative, and - most significantly - its
breadth and originality: in gathering together the voices of practitioners and
researchers from six countries speaking from varying perspectives on a vast
array of different themes within the oft-ignored junction of feminism and the
'psy' sciences, the editors offer the reader a refreshing and edifying survey of
an unfamiliar terrain.
22. Ussher, supra note 3, at 20.
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